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Multiculturalism in Malaysia:
Individual Harmony, Group Tension
Roxane Harvey Gudeman
“Lim Cheng Po came to tea. He took it in the English manner, enjoyed the
tomato sandwiches and the fruitcake, said, in his Balliol voice: ‘A pity one
can’t get crumpets here.’ He was a solicitor from Penang. . . . He was plump
and not unhandsome, his Chinese blood hardly apparent . . . He talked now
about the troubles in Penang that had just ended—terrorism and a curfew on
that one-time peaceful island. . . . 
‘Who starts it all?’ asked Crabbe.
‘My dear chap, that’s rather a naïve question, isn’t it? It just starts. Some
blame the Malays, others the Chinese. Perhaps a Malay shakes his fist at a
Chettiar money-lender and, for some obscure reason, that sets off a brawl in a
Chinese cabaret. Or a British tommy gets tight in K.L. and the Tamils start
spitting at a Sikh policeman. The fact is that the component races of this
exquisite and impossible country just don’t get on. There was, it’s true, a sort
of illusion of getting on when the British were in full control. But self-deter-
mination’s a ridiculous idea in a mixed-up place like this. There’s no nation.
There’s no common culture, language, literature, religion. I know the Malays
want to impose all these things on the others, but that obviously won’t work.
Damn it all, their language isn’t civilized . . . ’ He drank his tea and, like any
Englishman in the tropics, began to sweat after it. ‘When we British finally
leave there’s going to be hell.’”1
*****
Anthony Burgess’s novel Beds in the East, from which these words
were taken, was first published in 1959. Burgess, a colonial administra-
tor in Malaya and Borneo from 1954 through 1960, knew well the ter-
rain about which he wrote. In the novel, a friend, Lim Cheng-Po, is
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talking to Victor Crabbe, a Chief Education Officer in the colonial gov-
ernment. The passage refers to the “three races”—Malay, Chinese, and
Indian—that were a social-structural legacy of the British. It illustrates
how local minds, such as Lim Cheng-Po’s, could be colonized by the
overlords who invited an elite few to enter the margins of their “inner
circle.”
Those who participated in the planning for the new Malaysia were
well aware that they had inherited a volatile racial/cultural social
structure that had been constructed and defined by the British. From
its founding as an independent nation-state, Malaysia had the goal of
establishing a successful multicultural society composed of three tradi-
tionally isolated and mutually distrustful ethnic/cultural groups, the
Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians. Malaysia has achieved remark-
able economic and educational growth and thus far has avoided
almost all of the destructive ethnic violence that has been the fate of
too many new nations built, phoenix-like, from the ashes of exploita-
tive colonial regimes. In this essay, I will draw on theories and research
from social psychology to offer hypotheses about why, despite success
in implementing programs designed to bring about multicultural
alliances, many Malaysians remain concerned about the nation’s eth-
nic fragility.
Shamsul A.B. urges us to examine race and ethnicity in Malaysia not
only from the perspective of “ ‘authority-defined’ social reality, one
which is authoritatively defined by people who are part of the domi-
nant power structure” and whose positions are usually enshrined in
political, legal, religious, and academic documents, but also from the
perspective of “ ‘everyday-defined’ social reality . . . which is experi-
enced by the people in the course of their everyday life” and which “is
usually disparate, fragmented and intensely personal.”2 He notes that
everyday social reality is usually encoded orally or in popular visual
and verbal media. After a brief historical background, I will use com-
ments, opinions, and news reports gleaned during my January 2002
sojourn in Malaysia to sample some aspects of the everyday multicul-
tural social reality of Malaysians. These comments reveal the underly-
ing tensions among ethnic groups that must be addressed before
Malaysia can fulfill its multicultural promise. I note with humility that
the United States of America, likewise, has many racial and ethnic ten-
sions that similarly need to be addressed.
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*****
A. The British “Three Cultures” Model
At independence in 1957, Malaysia was a multicultural nation with
three “official” major cultural groups in addition to a European gov-
erning elite. These were the Malay and indigenous “Bumiputera”3 (peo-
ple of the soil), the majority of whom were Muslim and spoke a dialect
of Malay; the Indians, the majority of whom were Hindu Tamils; and
the Chinese, the majority of whom practiced a mix of Confucian, Bud-
dhist, and Taoist spiritual traditions, and who spoke one of several
Chinese dialects as well as Mandarin. That three and only three “cul-
tures” were recognized reflected British colonial social reality more
than that of the Bumiputera, Indian, and Chinese communities. Each
group was administered differently by the British. Individuals found it
in their self-interest to define themselves as a member of one of the
communities in order to be officially “recognized” by the colonial
overseers.
The Bumiputera were predominantly rural farmers or forest dwellers
governed by sultans. Family law, but not civil or criminal law, was
handled by traditional Islamic family courts. Few Malay children
attended school. The Chinese and Indian communities had their own
places of worship, community organizations, and schools that taught
in Chinese or Tamil and used texts and other educational materials
imported from China or India. The British made no attempt to build a
common Malayan peninsular identity among the populace; the three
communities existed largely segregated from each other. Speaking of
Malaysia in 1998, Zaleha Kamaruddin states:
[T]he most salient feature of the multiethnic society is that colonialism of
almost a hundred years, has contributed to a situation in which, until the
recent development plan periods . . . , each ethnic group has remained
almost entirely culturally distinct from the others. In short, the Chinese
and Indians have managed to preserve their own social and cultural
identities within a new common environment and this has been made
possible through a network of overlapping cleavages in the society in the
form of each group’s own social institutions, religious institutions and
educational system.4
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Shamsul A. B. elegantly describes how British-trained anthropolo-
gists helped construct the core ethnic identities found today in
Malaysia that were reified in the Constitution as well as in the New
Economic Plan and its successors: “In the Malaysian context, colonial
knowledge not only elaborated and explained about but also sustained
and justified the whole concept of plural society through the construc-
tion of essentialized ethnic categories . . . [N]ation-states . . .have become
the natural embodiments of history, territory and society built entirely
on colonial knowledge.”5
An elite British school system overlay the other systems of educa-
tion and helped produce a very small, Anglicized multicultural elite:
“Only at the highest level of government and professions, is there
extensive, effective contact between members of the three racial
groups and even then, it is largely on the common grounds of the
adopted British culture within each of the major ethnic societies of
Malaysia, this westernized elite remains aloof from the more tradition-
ally united ethnic communities that make up most of the urban and
virtually all of the rural population.”6 One of my informants com-
mented that all that this group of people have in common is Britain, a
core identity that has supplanted their local Malaysian ethnicities, as in
the case of Burgess’s Lim Cheng-Po.
In fact, at the time of independence, a much more complex social,
linguistic, and religious reality lay beneath this simple tripartite social
categorization. That Malaysia has three ethnic groups ignores the
diversity within these communities. The categories are a construction
of the British who officially treated each group — “native” Malays,
immigrants from China, and immigrants from India — as discrete,
however great the diversity within them. The architects of the new
nation-state of Malaysia inherited these categories and recognized
them in the Constitution. In so doing, they helped create a self-fulfill-
ing prophecy in which, over time, individual citizens have became
more “Malay,” “Chinese,” or “Indian.” However, even today, the
Malay, Chinese, and Indian communities actually are composed of
many sub-communities of language, culture, and religious practice.7
B. Creating a New Nation-State: Malaysia
At the time of independence, elite representatives of the three “races”
came together to create a parliamentary democracy composed of states
with considerable power over local affairs. A primary goal of the new
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national government was to create from the multiple communities a
single multicultural nation with a common identity. A common lan-
guage and a shared educational system were seen as important tools
for helping achieve this. Nair-Venugopal quotes the 1956 report of the
Education Committee: “The ultimate objective of education policy in
this country must be to bring together children of all races under a
national educational system in which the national language is the main
medium of instruction.”8 Islam, the religion of the Malays, was named
the state religion. Malay was chosen to be the national language.9 In
return for giving Malay language and culture priority in the new state,
the Chinese and Indian peoples were granted full citizenship for the
first time and guaranteed freedom of religion and the right to practice
their culture. The governing structure of Malay sultans remained in
place, but their authority became increasingly ceremonial and local
(affecting the state, not the nation). It was agreed that the sultans
would rotate a ceremonial kingship. The Malay majority would hold
political power, but only if they worked in partnership with Chinese
and Indian communities. The multiethnic United Malay Nationalist
Organization (UMNO) has been in power since independence.
At every level, the national government worked to create a shared
national culture, one nation, out of the three “racial”/cultural groups
present in various settings. For example, the major holidays of all cul-
tural groups were honored as universal holidays, while new national
holidays, such as Independence Day, were added. While Malay was to
be the primary language used in public schools, pupils were required
to learn English as a second language and be introduced to Chinese
and Tamil. Malays would also study Arabic. The system of private ele-
mentary schools with Chinese or Tamil instruction would be allowed
to continue and, ultimately, to receive state support.
Traditionally, the majority of Malays were rural peasant agricultur-
alists. The majority of Chinese were merchants and businessmen who
controlled a disproportionate share of the economy. Most Indians were
relatively unskilled laborers. Just over a decade after the nation’s
founding, the divisive issue of economic and educational disparities
among the cultural groups was addressed by the government via the
New Economic Policy (NEP). It introduced a broad array of “affirma-
tive action” programs with the goals of “the eradication of poverty
irrespective of race; [and] the elimination of the identification of race
with economic function.”10 Malays were the principal beneficiaries of
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these policies even though the Indian population was, on average,
even poorer and less well educated.
Today, many of the goals outlined by the founders and featured in
the New Economic Plan have been or are almost met. Malay has
become a national language spoken by all who have attended school
since independence, with English a secondary language that is widely
used in business and diplomacy.11 Students continue to study in their
first language in elementary school if their families choose. The major
political parties remain multicultural with a Malay majority. Educa-
tional and economic achievements have been very impressive and are
no longer tied closely to race, religion, or culture. Each cultural group
celebrates its holidays and, via the institution of Open Houses and
other mechanisms, invites those of other ethnic groups to share in the
festivities.12 The Prime Minister celebrated this success in his 2001
speech to the political party that he heads:
In Malaysia we find not only races which are different but these differ-
ences are aggravated by different languages, cultures and religions.
Indeed, this cultural mix becomes easily inflammable.
But Malay UMNO leaders in times of struggle for independence were
able to foster a smart and special system of racial cooperation. While
racial identities are retained, cooperation in a mixed party was created
which did not ignore the special Malays as the genuine Bumiputera . . .The
fact that a majority of Chinese were willing to support an Alliance Party
under the Malay leadership who strongly opposed the Chinese terrorists
was proof of the ability of UMNO Malay leadership in handling the big
racial problem in Malaysia—overcoming it without sacrificing the rights
of the Malays. There is no other multiracial country which has succeeded
in overcoming the racial problem as in Malaysia under the Malay leader-
ship of UMNO.13
Despite Malaysia’s remarkable achievement in creating a single
multicultural nation-state, there is alarm about its continuing
fragility.14 While a “common ground” among the cultural groups has
been built, the Malay, Chinese, and Indian cultural groups have
become more internally uniform and more ethnicized, described by
some as “hyper-ethnicized.”15
The Malay government may be observed defending itself against
two major sets of critics at home and abroad. Proponents of democracy
and human rights criticize the laws that restrict free speech and politi-
cal dissent, and Malaysia’s continuing use of affirmative action to priv-
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ilege Malays. Simultaneously, the government must counter the
charge of fundamentalist Muslims that Malaysia is not a genuine Mus-
lim state because it does not impose on all its citizens the hudud laws
described in the Quran. Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad addressed both sets of critics in a speech to the 55th General
Assembly of his political party, the UMNO, on June 21, 2001. Speaking
of Western, especially American, critics who oppose economic and
educational preferences for Malays, he states:
Foreigners who once colonized us, who have done nothing to help us . . .
attack the Malaysian Government and its leadership because seemingly
the government has not been fair to a certain group, has not been demo-
cratic . . . They claim that to protest and demonstrate is a basic human
right and democratic. But when this happens in their own country, they
beat, shoot and arrest these fighters who uphold these rights. They do
not act as they preach.16
After defending the UMNO’s policies against liberal democratic
critics, Dr. Mahathir immediately defended it against Muslim funda-
mentalist critics:
Is Malaysia not an Islamic nation?...What criteria should we use before a
nation can be regarded an Islamic nation? Please state clearly. Does it
mean that only after hudud laws are implemented that this group will
accept this government as not an infidel government, non-secular? (p.
43) As far as we can verify, no country has implemented the hudud law,
i.e., from court proceedings till the implementation of the hudud. This
does not mean they have rejected the religious tenets but it is because the
society today differs from that of the Prophet’s time.17
*****
The Malaysian government has done a superb job of creating contact
among members of different cultural groups in the workplace, in
schools, and in neighborhoods, where formerly there was little mixing.
And these opportunities to get to know people across ethnic bound-
aries have resulted in many successful working relationships and
friendships. But despite this, tensions between ethnic groups remain
high and may be increasing.
Table 1 contains a series of everyday observations representing
underlying interethnic tensions in Malaysia that were made by indi-
Macalester International Vol. 12
144
viduals or that appeared in the newspaper during January 2002. From
the perspective of understanding multicultural relations, it is not
important whether the statements are “true” or not; they represent the
often widely shared perceptions of many individuals. These observa-
tions form a subtext to my main arguments. They reveal that many
Malaysians feel discomfort and distrust when with strangers of other
ethnic groups. Non-Malays do not trust the government to look out for
their interests, especially as Malay identity becomes increasingly
Islamized in a world in which religious cleavages beyond the borders
of Malaysia are becoming deeper and more dangerous. There also con-
tinues to be strong criticism of the laws that limit freedom of speech
and academic freedom. Many continue to resent affirmative action
policies.
Table 1: Everyday Observations Suggestive of 
Interethnic Tensions—January, 2002
A. Observations about Affirmative Action
1. If there are ten slots at the university for Bumiputera and only six qualified
candidates, the university will still accept ten students. The result is too
many mediocre Malay students in competition with non-Malays who are
more qualified.
2. Once admitted to the university, Malay students get first choice of popu-
lar majors in science and engineering. As a result, Chinese and Indian stu-
dents and women are overrepresented in the liberal arts majors that are
least likely to lead to lucrative careers.
3. Malay students have sometimes charged faculty, both non-Malay and
Malay, with being racist when they are unhappy with their grades.
4. About 99 percent of the students at Malaysia’s 600 private colleges are
non-Malay. They tend to be very good students. Ironically, they often
have poorly trained faculty. The public universities have excellent facul-
ties but too many poor (Malay) students.
5. Several years ago, a Chinese girl received the highest scores in Malaysia
on university qualifying exams, yet she was not offered a scholarship by
the government until there was extensive public protest.
6. It is not easy for the Chinese to get over their bitterness about the affirma-
tive action policies. They feel pride when they note that educationally
they perform, on the average, even better than the Malays, without having
had the help that Malays receive. The Chinese who go to the United States
to study win scholarships at premier selective colleges and universities.
The Malays who study abroad do so on Malaysian government scholar-
ships at less prestigious universities.
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B. Observations about Freedom of Speech
7. At one time, most of the professors at the universities were Chinese. They
were biased in grading Malay students, especially females. To be success-
ful, Malays had to learn how the oppressors thought. Once they did that,
they could get good grades.
8. On Monday, “Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad . . .
[stated] that there might be a new law to stop kindergartens from spread-
ing the culture of hatred against the Government . . . There have been
claims that children in kindergartens are being taught to hate the Barisan
Nasional [sic] Government by spitting on the pictures of its leaders.”18
9. The Universities and University Colleges Act of 1971 made it illegal for
faculty or students to have political activity on campus. In 2002, faculty,
students, and other government employees will have to sign “an agree-
ment of good conduct . . . [that] requires them to, among others, be loyal to
the King, Government and university, and to heed orders.”19
10. Some students spy on their teachers. “On a list compiled by UMNO Youth
containing the names of lecturers spreading anti-Government messages,
Musa [the Education minister] said he would be taking action.”20
C. Observations about the Balance of Political Power in Favor of the
Malays and Muslims
11. In contrast to the world pattern that the fertility rate goes down as female
education and affluence rises, Malay middle-class couples continue to
have many children. They know that they do not have to worry about
paying for higher education and many other social needs because of affir-
mative action. The birth rate is much lower for middle-class Chinese cou-
ples. The result is that Malays will become a larger and larger proportion
of the Malaysian population, which will further increase their political
power in comparison to the Chinese and Indians.
12. The government has funded the International Islamic University, which
has students from 130 countries. The vast majority are Muslim. Non-Mus-
lim Malays may attend the university, but when they do, they often con-
vert to Islam.
13. If a non-Muslim marries a Muslim, he or she must convert to Islam. It is il-
legal to try to convert a Muslim to another faith. The edifice of laws that
protect Muslims from the religious influence of non-Muslims and which
prohibit them from leaving the faith create barriers and resentment, espe-
cially since there are no parallel laws protecting and restricting the practi-
tioners of other faiths.
14. The state government helps enforce charitable donations by Muslims in
the form of zakat money, which, according to Islamic law, is to be used
only to benefit Muslims. Non-Muslims comment that there are no social
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service safety nets in Malaysia. They feel threatened by their official exclu-
sion from benefiting from these charitable donations even when the rules
are sometimes interpreted to include them.
D. Observations about How Groups Block the Ability of Other Groups to
Practice their Culture
15. A non-Malay group wanted to build a temple. They were given land by
the sultan to do so. They laid the foundation, but then the Malays in the
area complained that the temple would be an affront to them, so permis-
sion to build the temple was retracted and the sultan took his land back.
The non-Malay group purchased land and built a second foundation;
again, Malays complained and they were ordered to stop. Now the group
does not have enough money to build a temple even if it had permission
to do so.
16. The sounds emanating from Hindu and Buddhist temples disrupt the
lives of Malays. There should be restrictions on placing them in areas
where Malays have a large majority presence.
17. Muslim girls and women are increasingly dressing in headscarves or tra-
ditional Muslim garments of the type that Arabic women wear. This is an
affront to the non-Muslims. In the past, when you saw a group of children
playing, they all looked the same. Now the Muslims are marked as differ-
ent. In government offices, there is a lot of pressure on women to cover. If
you do not, you may be isolated or treated as decadent.
18. At large public events, food that conforms to Muslim dietary laws are al-
ways served; the food preferences and dietary laws of other communities
are ignored.
19. “Nanyang Siang Pau and Sin Chew Jit Poh reported that Chinese commu-
nity leaders . . . felt confident that the Government would not amend the
Education Act to make Bahasa Malayu the sole medium of instruction for
all schools. The Chinese education movement, Don Jiao Zong, in champi-
oning the cause of Chinese education development has often expressed
fear that the Government has an ultimate aim to make Bahasa Malayu the
sole medium of instruction in the education system.”21
20. Malaysia cannot escape a second invasion and colonization of the mind
via the West’s a) global economic dominance, b) dominant voice in de-
manding that all nations adopt Western democracy, human rights, and
press freedom, and c) intrusive media — news, music, films, Internet, etc.
“And we are in danger of losing our identity.” (Professor Dr. Zawiah,
UKM-Macalester Seminar.)
E. Observations about Continuing Racial/Ethnic Separation in Malaysia
21. Now that people find themselves increasingly living in multiethnic com-
munities, they are beginning to build fences.
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22. Headline: “USM to conduct polarization study.” “Universiti Sains
Malaysia will conduct a polarization study to determine if racial segrega-
tion among its 15,000-odd students exists.”22 The article reports that in a
pilot study the year before, racial segregation was not observed. The study
no doubt was stimulated in part by an attempt by the University to assign
Muslims and non-Muslims to be roommates, which was strongly resisted
by the students and later abandoned. On campus, both students and fac-
ulty speak informally of segregation as an everyday state of affairs. Visu-
ally, it is evident also in students moving about the campus and seated in
classrooms.
23. In Malaysia, “You live in your own cocoon. You interact, but you don’t
cross dangerous boundaries.” The racial groups respectfully coexist. “Is 
that enough?” (Professor Doctor Zawiah, UKM-Macalester Seminar.)
I will argue that the cultural tensions in Malaysia have multiple
complementary sources. First, the construction of inter-ethnic relation-
ships requires people to accommodate to each other’s cultures in ways
that are threatening to their cultural groups taken as collectivities. Sec-
ond, increasing interdependence creates increasing vulnerability, espe-
cially in groups that must rely on the good intentions of a more
powerful political majority. Third, as the Malays have moved away
from their kampongs to urban areas and have become more affluent,
Islam has become a far more important component of their cultural
identity, a source of disquiet for non-Muslim Malaysians. Finally, criti-
cisms of affirmative action plans are intensified when the group in
political power enacts plans that selectively benefit its own cultural
group.
*****
A. Inter-ethnic Friendships; Inter-group Conflict
An influential model about how to reduce inter-ethnic hostility has
been the contact hypothesis. It asserts that members of groups who
have negative stereotypes about each other and who are mutually sus-
picious and hostile will become more friendly and less prejudiced
when they interact in situations in which they share common superor-
dinate goals and relate to each other as cooperative equals. But the
data have not always supported the hypothesis. In fact, as political sci-
entist H. D. Forbes shows, the contact hypothesis seems to apply only
to interdependent individuals who interact frequently and share com-
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mon goals.23 When entire groups come into contact, such as in desegre-
gated schools, tensions are sometimes reduced but sometimes not. The
larger the size of groups in contact, the less likely it is that distrust,
prejudice, and hostility will be lessened. Forbes reports that when
groups as large as “whole countries, cities, counties or neighborhoods
are compared . . . greater contact is generally associated with greater
conflict and hostility.”24
There is much evidence that many individual Malaysians have
indeed begun to forge mutually beneficial, friendly relationships
across ethnic and religious boundaries. Mansor Mohd Noor25 describes
a series of five studies, conducted from 1990 through 1998, with Chi-
nese and Malay business people, workers, and students. The majority
made responses that suggest that they would readily engage in a wide
variety of business and personal relationships with persons outside
their cultural group. For example, a majority of people in both commu-
nities indicated that they would choose an inter-ethnic relationship
over an intra-ethnic relationship if the shopkeeper of the other ethnic-
ity charged less than the shopkeeper of the same ethnicity. But the
examples that Mansor investigated all involve individual, personal
interactions. He invited participants in his research to respond to a
variety of hypothetical situations in which a Malay Malaysian or a Chi-
nese Malaysian must decide whether to interact with someone of the
same ethnicity or choose someone of a different ethnicity who offered
a better financial outcome, a more prestigious social outcome (e.g.,
your child could play with a same-ethnicity laborer’s child versus the
child of a doctor of another ethnicity), or someone to whom one had a
personal obligation (e.g., support your boss versus support someone of
the same ethnicity). Reviewing his results, Mansor concludes:
The findings of the five studies observed . . . proved that ethnic identity
and group strength in Malaysia is a case of secondary ethnicity . . . The
increasing importance of societal goals that can be pursued by individ-
ual action has reduced group consciousness. The consciousness of being
Malay, Chinese, or Indian in Malaysia resembles the secondary ethnicity
of North America more than the primary ethnicity that has contributed
to the tensions in the former Yugoslavia.26
A proponent of rational choice theory, Mansor attributes this to self-
interest: “These changes have been made possible by Malaysia’s high
rate of economic growth which has enabled the Malaysian-Malays to
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catch up with the Malaysian-Chinese without the latter suffering any
decline in their economic circumstances.”27
Buried in Mansor’s data, however, are some cautionary findings
that serve to amend his conclusions. First, on average, the Chinese per-
sons in his samples endorsed making inter-ethnic choices more
strongly than did the Malays. For example, 82 percent of the Chinese
middle-class residents of Petaling Jaya made inter-ethnic choices that
would benefit them materially in contrast to only 62 percent of the
Malays.28 In the same study, only 22 percent of the Malays preferred a
higher status inter-group social choice over a lower status intra-group
choice as compared to 56 percent of the Chinese.29 In general,
Malaysian Malays and Chinese were much more likely to prefer same
ethnicity social relationships than same ethnicity economic relation-
ships even when they might gain greater social status from choosing
an inter-ethnic partner. The results suggest that Malays are more likely
to make within-group ethnic choices than are the Chinese.
Mansor also asked people about their actual pattern of inter-ethnic
contact at the group level. The results were very different. The same
individuals who support having inter-ethnic individual relationships
report rather low levels of actual inter-ethnic contact in their own lives
in every sphere except the workplace. While these rates are undoubt-
edly far higher than they would have been at independence, and there-
fore can be said to represent a great deal of progress, they still are not
high. Across Mansor’s five samples, about 50 percent of both Malays
and Chinese had frequent inter-ethnic contact in the workplace, but
only about 22 percent did in their residential area, and only 5 percent
did at the place where they went shopping.
More ominously, the Malays are much more likely than the Chinese
to disagree with the statement that “Malysia is not just for the Malays”
(Malay average=27%; Chinese average=7%), and much more likely to
agree that “those individual Malaysians who are dissatisfied with this
country should migrate out to another country of their choice.” (Malay
average=63%; Chinese average=47%).30
Mansor’s data, together with the observations in Table 1, suggests to
me that while individual Malaysians welcome friendly relations with
individuals of other ethnicities, there continues to be distrust at the
group level. Forbes explains why this can be expected to occur in his
linguistic model of ethnic conflict.31 He first analyzes the situation
when people who speak different languages must learn to communi-
cate with each other. They do so, he argues, by developing a common
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language and a common set of interpretive frameworks. The two par-
ties accommodate to each other, in the process assimilating some of the
worldview and language of the other; they become more alike. But in
most cases, one person or group has had to adapt more than the other.
In Malaysia, it was decided that the Chinese, Indian, and English-
speaking communities would have to learn Malay if they were to be
full participants in Malaysian society.32 Forbes argues that this model
of linguistic accommodation applies more broadly to cultural groups
in contact. Adaptations occur that result in the groups becoming more
alike, with the less powerful group usually forced to change more.
Forbes concludes that: a) “contact leads to conflict between groups in
situations of mixed competitive and cooperative incentives,”33 b) when
contact reduces tension, it does so by bringing about assimilation, and
c) this assimilation into the culture of the other will precipitate a nega-
tive response at the group level, as the group perceives its boundaries
and identity to be threatened. In the case of Malaysia, then, one would
predict that the Chinese and Indians would feel greater ethnic threat
from the other cultural groups than would the Malays, and this
appears to be the case.
As strongly as the evidence demonstrates that many individual
Malaysians have an increasing number of inter-ethnic friendships and
congenial working relationships, the data also supports Forbes’ argu-
ment that at the group level such inter-ethnic relations may actually
intensify the development of in-group solidarity and out-group antag-
onism. Taken collectively, the Malays and Chinese feel threatened by
the erosion of the traditional patterns of segregation, which helped to
maintain their communities as culturally distinct. Signs of a growth of
a ‘single’ Malaysian culture are responded to with renewed efforts to
reinforce and even extend cultural distinctiveness. The Malaysian tra-
dition of the “Open House” is a good example of a ritualized way in
which, simultaneously, difference as well as multiculturalism are
marked.
B. Increasing Interdependence Brings Increasing Vulnerability
As Malaysia’s three central cultural groups have become more interde-
pendent, they increasingly have the power to aid or to interfere with
the other groups’ ability to fulfill their goals. Fiske and Ruscher believe
that interdependence helps explain why in-groups tend to dislike or
fear out-groups in situations such as that found in Malaysia, where the
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societal outcomes for each single cultural group is viewed as contin-
gent on the interactions of all three groups.34 They suggest that mere
difference is threatening, for in-groups may not be able to control or
predict what out-groups will do and how they might facilitate or hin-
der the in-group. The unpredictability of others is aversive and creates
dislike, distrust, anxiety, unease, uncertainty, and other negative emo-
tions. There is often considerable pressure to avoid contact and inti-
macy with the out-group. Out-groups also have the power to block the
fulfillment of in-group goals, which places them in a relationship of
“negative interdependence.” This is enhanced if the groups are also in
direct competition. This is, of course, exactly the case in situations in
which race/ethnicity-based affirmative action is practiced. But even
when there is no direct competition, negative interdependence can be
created by the mere fact that members of the two groups may be com-
pared to each other to the advantage of one versus the other. When
groups have different goals, the attainment of their goals may interfere
with each other. When groups are in asymmetrical interdependence,
“one party has more power to block the other’s goals and hence more
power over outcomes . . . In asymmetrical relationships, the relations
among negative affect, prejudice, interdependence, and stereotyping
are thus particularly insidious.”35 In Malaysia, the Chinese and Indian
communities find themselves in an asymmetrical relationship with the
Malays, who hold greater power. They vigilantly monitor events so
that they can “read” the intentions of the majority in order to assess
whether they can trust the government to be respectful of their com-
munity and trustworthy in acting equitably for the good of all citizens,
Malay or non-Malay. The increasing Islamization, some call it the Ara-
bization, of the Malay middle class is viewed with alarm in a world in
which the actions of Muslim fundamentalists fill the news.
Chinese Malaysians are also concerned that they make up a declin-
ing proportion of the population, which further erodes their political
power. Since independence in 1957, some Chinese have chosen to emi-
grate. The Chinese birth rate is much lower than that of the Malays. In
addition, any non-Muslim who marries a Muslim will have children
who are defined as Malay.
C. The Islamization of the Malay Middle Class
In the West, it has been assumed that as people become better edu-
cated and as they move into an urban middle class, they will become
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more liberal and more secular. But this has not happened in Malaysia.
Instead, if anything, Malay identity has become more singularly tied to
Islam than it had been prior to educational and economic develop-
ment.36 Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan provides a fascinating analysis of
Islamization among newly middle-class Malays.37 It illustrates how a
separation from the previous moorings for an ethnic identity can be
followed by an intense effort to reconstruct the original identity and
protect it, sometimes redefining the core identity in the process. In the
1960s and thereafter, many Malays moved from rural areas into cities
where traditional forms of support for their identity — the village, the
extended family, etc. — were absent. In addition, having been isolated
from other cultural groups, they found themselves confronted with
difference: “They needed for example, to live in close physical proxim-
ity with the non-Malays, imbibe Western cultural habits and practices,
adhere to norms of individualism, and subscribe to an acquisitive
lifestyle.”38 In response, for many newly middle-class Malays, Islam
became a more important component of their Malay identity than it
had been. Sharifah offers a case history of the growing importance of
the Muslim component of Malay identity in Bandar Baru Bangi
(Bangi), a new town in Selangor located near several research centers
and universities, including Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM).
Most of the residents who began to move there in the late 1970s were
employed at these institutions and were well-educated professionals,
administrators, or middle-class business people. Both in Bangi and at
UKM a strong Islamic revival movement emerged in the 1980s. When
first opened for residents, Bangi had only houses and a few shops. On
their own initiative, Bangi’s Muslim residents formed study groups,
places for prayer, charitable groups to serve needy Muslims, and a
variety of other community services. “Within the general climate of
heightened religious consciousness . . . the preacher [of a surau or place
of worship smaller than a mosque] would draw the attention of those
present to issues of moral decadence and disunity among Muslims and
the need to observe as closely as possible Islamic prescriptions with
regard to worship, dress code, dietary habits and the proper way for
men and women to interact with one another.”39 At the time of the case
study, there were about 40,000 people in Bangi, of whom about 85 per-
cent were Muslim Malays. Most were strongly committed to dakwah,”
the task of proselytizing to non-Muslims and making Muslims better
Muslims.”40
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Sharifah argues that when rural peasant Malays became middle-
class urbanites:
[I]t was no longer possible for the Malay middle class to defend existing
identities that were constructed on the presumption that social bonds
could be effectively forged through descent, ethnic origin, loyalty to the
state, the village, the local patron and religious . . . Thus they had to rely
on Islamic institutions to forge and activate new identities . . . [T]here
emerged in Bandar Baru Bangi Malay-Muslims who were forward look-
ing, present-oriented, and who were constantly striving to bring com-
mon Malay-Muslim identity to a higher level of Islamicity.41
Johan Saravanamuttu suggests that the issue of what it means to be
both an Islamic state and a multicultural state is a critical one in South-
east Asia.42 He proposes that despite some Muslim voices who would
argue that an Islamic state must impose Muslim laws on all, there are
others who strongly believe that “universalist and humanist Islamic
perspectives can accommodate multicultural practices.”43
D. Affirmative Action in Malaysia and American Higher Education
For over three decades, both Malaysia and the United States have prac-
ticed affirmative action in higher education. In both countries
race/culture-sensitive admissions and financial aide policies, and a
variety of enrichment programs, have made it possible for many per-
sons to achieve university degrees who were from groups that were
historically underrepresented in higher education: the Malays in
Malaysia; and African-Americans, Latinos, Native Americans and,
sometimes, Asian-Americans in the United States. In both countries,
these programs have been successful in greatly expanding the repre-
sentation of persons from groups who were beneficiaries of the poli-
cies in middle class business, educational, administrative and
professional careers.44
Controversial from their beginning, criticism of the programs in
both countries has intensified as what were originally meant to be
short-term programs to remedy past discrimination have continued.
Critics charge that the programs contravene the ideal of equal oppor-
tunity under the law that is a foundational value in both countries. In
both countries, the ideal is to have individuals compete for admissions
and for jobs, etc., with the “best qualified” being selected. Affirmative
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action was justified in both Malaysia and the U.S. because it was sup-
posed to undo the racist policies and practices of segregation and
exclusion that had violated the principles of equal opportunity and
meritocratic selection under British colonial rule in Malaysia and
under systems of white privilege in the United States.
Those who support affirmative action in Malaysia and the U.S. note
that while much has been accomplished, progress toward economic
and educational parity in all racial/ethnic groups has been harder to
achieve than originally anticipated. They argue that affirmative action
policies continue to be needed until persons of all races/ethnicities
have an equal probability of educational and economic success. In
addition, in the United States, supporters of affirmative action have
begun to argue that in educational settings, persons of all races and
ethnicities benefit from the enriched learning environment that occurs
when the student body and faculty are from multiple cultures.45
Both in Malaysia and in the U.S., there are many who perceive affir-
mative action to be unjust. They argue that the ends do not justify the
means, that affirmative action is a procedural injustice designed to
bring about a “false” distributive justice, which thus poisons the out-
come. In other words, process is important. Social psychologists have
shown that even when people are unhappy with outcomes, they will
accept them and even help implement them if they believe that the
outcome was arrived at in a fair, just way. Tyler, Degoeu, and Smith46
demonstrate that individuals and groups view a process or procedure
to have been just when the decision makers are perceived to have been
neutral (unbiased, thorough, and honest), trustworthy (benevolent and
concerned about all), and when they have honored the status of all
parties (polite and respectful of “rights and entitlements due to every
group member”47). In a series of experiments, Tyler, et. al. showed that
individuals and groups interpret procedural fairness to their group as
indicative that they and their group are respected and valued, and it is
this that motivates them, in turn, to accept even decisions unfavorable
to them, and to put group interests above their own. In the context of
Malaysia, this suggests that the Chinese and Indian communities
would be more willing to accept affirmative action or other programs
that limit opportunity based on merit if they perceive the Malay
authorities to be neutral and trustworthy, and they view the Malays as
valuing their contribution to Malaysia, and respectful of their beliefs
and culture. They will resent and resist policies that they perceive to
have been enacted selfishly and disrespectfully.
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One might anticipate that it is much harder for the Malay-domi-
nated government to make the case that their affirmative action pro-
grams are neutral, trustworthy, and respectful of the status of all
cultural groups even if they are wise policies from the standpoint of
developing a well educated, economically successful populace. A
major structural difference between the affirmative action policies
implemented in the U.S. and in Malaysia is that the people who bene-
fited from affirmative action were not the same people who enacted it
in the U.S., whereas they were in Malaysia. In the United States, Euro-
pean-American men held political and economic power. Affirmative
action to benefit women and persons of color could not have been
introduced without their support. In Malaysia, the majority in political
power is also the beneficiary of affirmative action, therefore it is much
harder to defend against charges of bias and self-interest.
*****
Malaysia has undergone profound social change since independence.
It has achieved unprecedented economic and educational growth in a
climate of relative harmony. Inter-ethnic relations have been both
helped and threatened by these changes. In this essay, I have sug-
gested that Malaysia’s minority ethnic groups have conflicting evi-
dence about the extent to which the Malay majority listens to their
concerns and is responsive to their needs. Malaysia’s political leaders
must become even more responsive to the perspectives of the Chinese
and Indian communities. Because Malays are a growing majority, it
could be all too easy to ignore the significant contributions — and
needs—of the minority Chinese and Indian cultural groups.
Both Malaysia and the United States represent noble experiments
whose founders conceived of a “nation of intent”48 that offered equal
opportunity and full human rights to all of its citizens. In both coun-
tries, these nations of intent have not yet been fully realized for all
racial/cultural groups. To more closely achieve this goal, both nations
must address the concerns of their constituent communities, and work
to build a stronger infrastructure of mutual trust and respect. 
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3. Bumiputera, people of the soil, refers to the descendents of the indigenous peoples of
what is now Malaysia prior to the arrival of European colonizers from Portugal and
Great Britain. The Malay people of Malaysia include those from neighboring “nation-
states” with similar cultural roots.
4. Zaleha Kamaruddin 1998, p. 11.
5. Shamsul A.B. 1999, p. 152.
6. Kamaruddin, p. 12.
7. In addition to the indigenous Malay population, people now designated “Malay”
include the descendents of immigrants from “Indonesia, Aceh, Mandiling, Rawa, Ker-
inchi, Batak, Bugis and Javanese. There are also Arabs who form a small but very influ-
ential group in trade and religion” (Zalaha Kamaruddin 1998, p. 15). The indigenous
Malay also are comprised of populations with somewhat different cultures and lan-
guages. The Malay language itself, now known as Bahasa Malayu, today actually con-
sists of two main variants of one dialect of common Malay (as opposed to a royal form).
There is also a pidgin Malay, “Bazaar Malay,” and a Creole, “Baba Malay,” which is spo-
ken by the descendents of Chinese-Malay intermarriages dating back hundreds of years.
The Chinese came to Malaysia from many different provinces. In order of frequency,
they came speaking Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka, and Teochew, with several smaller lin-
guistic communities speaking Hokchiu, Hokchia, and Hengua. (Nair-Venugopal 2000;
Zaleha Kamaruddin 1998, p. 37.) Malaysians from the Indian subcontinent may speak
Tamil, Malayalam, Telugu, or Punjabi; they may be Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, or Christian.
There are also speakers of a Portuguese Creole, Cristang, which grew in the community
of descendents of Portuguese-Malay intermarriages.
8. Nair-Venugopal 2000, p. 42. English might have been an “efficient” national language
because it was the one spoken by some people from all of the Malaysian subcontinent’s
populations, but it was an unpopular choice due to its association with colonial rule.
Malay was chosen both because it was the language of the indigenous majority and of
the sultanates.
9. The Constitution defines a Malay as: “A person who professes Islam, habitually
speaks Malay, conforms to Malay customs and was born before Merdeka Day [Indepen-
dence Day in August, 1957].in the Federation or born of parents, due to whom was born
in the Federation or was on Merdeka Day domiciled in the Federation; or is the issue of
such a person” (Zaleha Kamaruddin 1998, p. 13).
10. Mahathir Mohamad 1998, p. 80.
11. Nair-Venugopal 2000.
12. Abdul Rahman Embong 1998, 2001; Saravanamuttu 2001; Noor Aini Abdullah-Amir
2000.
13. Mahathir Mohamad 2001, p. 29.
14. Musa 1999.
15. Maznah and Wong 2001; Saravanamuttu 2001.
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23. Forbes 1997.
24. Ibid., p. 168.
25. Mansor Mohd Noor 1999.
26. Ibid., p. 82.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 68.
29. Ibid., p. 70.
30. Ibid., p. 75.
31. Forbes 1997.
32. In practice, the languages needed to participate fully in a community may vary. For
example, English is essential in business and in diplomacy. In other contexts, one must
know Malay or a Chinese language. In one seminar, a Malay participant noted that it
was hard for non-Chinese to be an equal partner in a Chinese enterprise because of lan-
guage and other cultural barriers. A Chinese Malaysian commented privately that
exactly the same kind of exclusion could occur when a Chinese Malaysian from a differ-
ent Chinese linguistic and cultural subculture joined a Chinese firm. The key was not
whether you were Chinese or not, but whether you were expert at the particular cultural
style of those in power.
33. Forbes 1997, p. 168.
34. Fiske and Ruscher 1993. Fiske and Ruscher’s analysis concerns interactions among
individuals with different group memberships. They believe that the same phenomena
would apply to groups in interaction and note: “Our hunch is that group-level disrup-
tion and prejudice is a more intense version of the phenomena identified here” (p. 263).
35. Ibid., p. 254.
36. Saravanamuttu 2001.
37. Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan 2001.
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39. Ibid., p. 128.
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42. Saravanamuttu 2001, p. 19.
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44. Abdul Rahman Embong 1998, 2001; Bowen and Bok 1998.
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